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ondesired hours, undertheassumptions thatthese arebasedona smoothconvex
approximation of the budget constraint. The minimum distance approach used
allows for correlated random effects both in the wage and in the taste-shifter
equations, and for an unbalanced panel. We use a subsample of the German
Socio-economicPanel for the years 1985-1989.
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No life cycle labour supply model with taxes has previously been estimated for
the Federal Republic ofGermany. Yet such models are needed for the analysis
of life cycle effects of the tax system, as well as for the analysis of retirement
decisions. The parameters of interest for such studies are the preference para-
meters governing intertemporal decisions concerning the consumption of com-
modities and the supplyoflabour.Itis thus importanttodiselltangle preferences
from constraints faced by the household, and in this respect it seems reasonable
toexploittheinformationondesired hourscontainedintheSocio-EconomicPanel
(SOEP). The question answered by participants is:
'Ifyouwerefree tochoose how many hours towork, andtakinginto account
. that your earnings would change withlOur hours worked, how many hours
perweek would you choose to work?'
The question is interesting in that it asks the-respondent to reason in economic
terms and take her budget constraint into account rather than to refer to some
"bliss point". It lacks precision in that it does not specify exactly which budget
constraint should be taken into account: (i) Should the marketwage be assumed
constant, or should information on differences between full-time and part-time
wagesbetakenintoaccount? (ii) Shouldtheearningsofotherhouseholdmembers
be assumed constant? See Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990, p.233) for anexample of
a data setwhere all these ambiguities are avoided. Herewe model the answer as
ifitwereclearthattherespondentshould assumeherbudgetconstrainttoremain
unaffected, and that the actual hours of her spouse remain unchanged. For
non-participants we only have information on their desire to find a part-time or
a full-time job or to remain outside of the labour market, and we use only the
latter dichotomous information.2
Since the SOEP contains no usable information onconsumption, the onlyway to
eliminate the marginal utility oflifetime wealth in the first order conditions for
aninterioroptimumalongthelines ofMaCurdy (1983) wouldbetouseequations
for male and female desired hours simultaneously. Even when using an unbal-
ancedpanel,giventherelativelysmallnumberofindividualsincludedintheSOEP,
this would lead to very small number of observations, due to the extent of the
information required and the corresponding occurrences of mi~singvalues.
The use ofunbalanced panels is a necessity when working with household data:
insistingonworkingwithbalancedpanelsleadstotheparadoxicalsituationwhere
an increase in the number of available waves decreases sample size in teI.ms of '
individuals,.independently from data collection problems, simply because ofthe
1 The original text of the question is: "Wenn Sie den Umfang Ihrer Arbeitszeit selbst wahlen konnten und dabei
beriicksichtigten,daB sichIhrVerdienstentsprechendderArbeitszeitlindernwiirde: WievieleStundenin derWoche
wiirden Sie dann am liebsten arbeiten?"
2 The potential efficiency gain from using more information can be but tiny, since the proportion ofjob seekers is
very small anyway.nature ofthe phenomenon studied. Since, in this first approach, we do not wish
to take male hours orwage information into account, for the reasons mentioned
above,we assume contemporaneousseparabilitybetweendesired malehoursand
all other arguments of the utility function. The obvious alternative would be to
assume actual male hours exogenous and include their level as an explanatory
variable.Testingwhetherthe coefficientofmale hours is zerowould then provide
a simple separability test.
Another limitation ofthe version ofthe Socio-Economic Panel available to us at
present is thatit contains very little regional information. As a result it is difficult
for us to combine extraneous demand side information with the information in
the dataset in a meaningful way: since at present we only know in which federal
state andwhich type ofagglomeration a household resides this is notsufficient to
characterize its local labour market. Furthermore, there is almost no variation in
thedatasetas regards the time ofinterview, so that, atleast as long as we use only
yearly information and do not go down to the leyel ofthe calendaries, we cannot
take advantage oftimevariation in demand side conditions. Thus we reckon that
using demand side variables such as unemployment rate and growth rates of
employment at the federal state level would not constitute a substantial
improvement over taking account of heterogeneity between states, between
periodsandbetweendifferenttypesofagglomeration.Oureconometrictreatment
ofobservations with missing wage information, orwith irregular employment or
-unemployment takes care of some of the problems that availability of detailed
informationondemandconditions might helpto handle more explicitly. A casual
glance at Figure 1 shows that desired hours are likely to be influenced by the
availc:Ibility ofthecorresponding (hours,wage) offers. Itis also apparentthatmost
respondents give answers that are multiples of 5. We shall cope with this by
considering ranges of desired hours as the observed dependent variable rather
than the actual level ofdesired hours. This technique is used by Blundell et al.
(1991) bufwe are in a better position to use it here, because we do not have to
make their assumption that actual and desired hours fall into the same interval.
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3Figure 1: Desired and observed hours ofparticipants, 1987, cont.
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Inthis first approachwe shall assume that each woman makes a lifetime plan for
her desired hours at each period under perfect certainty as regards wage rates,
taxrules, interestrates, and household incomes otherthan herearnings. We shall
further assume perfect capital markets and intertemporal separability of the
(household) utility function.
These assumptions are all questionable andwe will obviously want to relax them
as much as possible in futurework. Inparticularitwould appearpromisingtouse
simultaneously the desired and observed hours in a permanent replanning
framework underuncertainty. Desired hours atperiod t would depend on actual
hours at period t-1. There might be scope also for modelling the way in which
desiredhoursinfluencetheavailabilityofcorrespondingjobsinthemedium-term,
in a matching framework.
Thepaperis organized as follows: in Section2we presentgeneral ideas aboutthe
specification of A-constant models based on the formulation of a direct utility
function, and taking account oftaxes; Section 2 also describes a spec;ialization to
parallel within-period preferences. Section 3 discusses econometric consider-
ations. Einally Section 4 presents estimation results. Appendices discuss data
problems, the Germantax system and our approximation to it for the purpose of
this study,>and the.technique used for unbalanced panels.
42 Lambda-constant Models, Parallel Preferences and the German Tax System
The main problem inspecifying A:-constant modelswhile taking income taxation
into account is described by Blomquist (1985).3 Without going much into detail,
thepoint is thatinteresting A.-constant models, from a practicalpointofview, are
models where current labour supply only depends on the current realwage and
themarginalutilityofwealth.This resultsfrom intertemporalseparabilityipboth
the preferences and the budgetconstraint. But taxation ofcapital income breaks
theseparabilityoftheintertemporalbudgetconstraint.Blomquistshows thatthis
still causes no difficulty ifcapital income taxation has no impact on.the taxation
of earnings. Unfortunately this is not the case in Germany, where all income
sources are lumped together after various specific allowances, in order to assess
overalltaxableincome.Ontheotherhand,ourhouseholdstypicallyreporttaxable
capitalincomethatiswellwithinthetax-allowance.Wethusassumecapitalincome
taxation away, and report empirical evidence- supporting that assumption in
AppendixA.
Given thestrongnon-linearityoftheincome taxschedulein Germany, itdoes not
seem tenable to assume a linear income tax, even locally. But a convex and dif-
ferentiable approximation to the tax schedule is both computationally easy to
handle (see MaCurdy et al. 1990) and empirically justifiable (see Appendix B).
In order to avoid non-convexity of the budget set arising from means-tested
benefits, we will exclude households entitledtothem.This amountsto a selection
based on 'other' household income, which is assumed exogenous here.
We nowturntothedescriptionofageneralmodel, startingfrom thespecification
of a direct utility function.






T: known time horizon,
p: rate oftime preference,
U t: period t utility function,
Ct: household aggregate consumption in period t.
Lt: desired leisure offemale in period t.
3 Although this text is meant to be self-contained, the reader may fmd it helpful to refer to the survey ofLaisney et
al. (1992) on the estimation oflife-cycle labour supply models.
5(3)
explicitly
A 0: assets in period 0,
r: interest rate,
WI: female gross wage rate, exogenous,
known in period 0 for each future period l,
N I:.desired hours of-work offemale in period t: LI = II - N I' where I I denotes
the leisure endowment in period t.
YI: husband's income, exogenous, known in period 0 for each future period t,
T I: approximate tax function for period t.
The approximate tax function is (see Appendix B for details):
T ICY. W N) = T OICY) + LOICY)min{WN, B I - E}
rmin{8,. WN}




T 01(Y): tax paid ifwife does not work,
1: 0'/: 'marginal tax rate on plateau "low hours" (see appendix),
BI: Floorfor social security contributions,
E: Width of intetval before B I for cubic spline approximation: there is a dis-
continuityin the profile ofthe marginal tax ratebutfor maximum likelihood it is
easier towork with twice differentiable functions, 'hence the approximation (see
Appendix for a discussion ofits quality),
S P tC•): cilbic spline: polynomial defined by zero and first-order conditions at
end-points ofsmall approximation intetval,
f).t: height ofjump at B I ,
L ' t: slope ofmarginal tax rate profile afterjump.
The first order conditions (with Ct ~ 0,0 :$ Lt :$ I t and only Lt :$\It
taken into account) include the lifetime budget restriction (2) and
oUt= ( 1 + p)t'\,
'" t = 0 •...,T
oCt 1 + r
oUt (1 + p)1 [ oTI ] -> -- 'AW 1---
oLI - l+r I oWINI '
6
t = 0,...,T (4)where A is the Lagrange multiplier ofthe lifetime budget restrictionand either
L t = It'or (4) holds with equality. The solutions (when they exist) are the Frisch
or A-constantdemands C[Ato W t] •L[Ato W t],with
(
1+ p)t A = -- "A
t l+r
(5)
and A is implicitly determined by substitution ofthese demand functions in (2).
Thus, A is a function oftheentirewage profile {W t • t = 0 •...•T }. oftheinitial
wealth A 0 • andoftheinterestandtimepreferencerates rand p . Itis asufficient,
statistic ofthe past and the future as far as the present decision is concerned.
The most convenient assumption concerning interest rates and the rate of time
preference parameters would be that they coincide in each period, so that both
vanish without being restricted to being constant. Yet this is unacceptable since
there is noreasontobelieve thattime preference shouldvary across thebusiness
cycle and notvary between indidviduals.
No,essentialchange arises in (5) ifinterestrates orrates oftimepreference differ
be~een periods, since:
t 1 + P ,
Inn -1--
5
= t[In( 1 + p)t-In( 1 + r)t]' (6)
5-1 + r 5
(8)
(7) t = 0.....T.
We now turn to the specialization to parallel preferences. Substituting (3) iil~o
(4) we obtain:
(
oUt OUt) (OTt ) In-/- ~ InWt+ln 1---- .
oLt oCt oWtNt
Given oursituation this will be interesting ifand only ifthe MRS is independent
of consumption, and is a function of leisure alone, that is, if contemporaneous
preferences are quasi-linear (indifference curves are parallel, see for instance
Laffont, 1988, p.139ff.). This implies thatthere is noincome effectonleisure. We'
see that regardless of the normalization chosen for within-period preferences,
hours supplied will be independent of assets in period 0, interest rates and the
rateoftime preference. This is ofcourse an extremelyrestrictive assumption, but
given the complexity of the estimation strategy pursued here, it will provide a
convenientbenchmark.InthatcaseFrischdemandsfor leisurecorrespondexactly
with Hicksian and with Marshallian demands and depend only on the realwage.
Yet, since static models of female labour supply typically yield small income
elasticities, this may not be such a bad model. In detail:
U t(Ct' Lt) = F t[Ct + V t(L,)] =: F t[U:( C,. Lt)]
forsomeincreasingfunctions F t and V I • Wespecifytheparsimoniousparametric
form
7with






Utility increasing in leisure requires Yt > o. This is easily achieved in estimation
by specifying an equation·for 1n Yt. Convexity of indifference curves requires
f3 t < 1 . Thus for an interior solution
oUt oUt au; (3,-1





InL,=ln(L,-N,)=--{-lnYt+1nW,+ln[I-L,(Yt.W,N,)]}. (13) f3, - 1
Onemaywantto allow I t tovary betweenindividuals, besidesvarying overtime.
Itseems arbitrarytoforce demographicvariables toactonpreferenceswhenthey
mightjustaswellinfluencetherestrictionontimeavailableforallocationbetween
leisure andmarketactivities (see thecritiquein NakamuraandNakamura, 1992).
3 Econometrics
We complete the specificationwith the choice ofpossibly overlapping vectors of








og f3 - 1 1 01:
oN(N;W,<l)=I_N-l-1:(Y,WN)Wo(WN)' (17)
8where a denotes the vector ofall parameters appearing on the righthand side,--
we can rewrite (13) in the form
g(N;W.a)-Z!+E 1 • (16)
Denotingwith N· the latentlaboursupply solutionof(16), we distinguish three
typesofobservations: (i) N· < 0,nowageobserved; (ii) N· > 0,nowageobserved
withprobabilityII = P[z· <0];(iii) N· > 0,wageobservedwithprobability1 - n .
We assume that, conditional on the latent variable z· governing wage observ-
abilitythe error terms of (15) and (16) are bivariate normal independent of X
and Z • withvariances 0 ~ • 0 ~. andcovariance 0 12' Ata laterstagewewill want
totestandpossiblyrelaxtheseassumptions.Theobviouscritiqueis thatwe ignore
the existence of discouraged workers. However, Rettore and Trivellato (1991)
give empirical evidence allowing to do this for a well defined notion of partici-
pation, andwe adopt a definition ofparticipationwhich is as near as possible to




where w denotes InW, with
a: Not employed, not looking for a job:
• (---Zcl>+X'lJ-(f3- 1)lnI+ln(1- Lo))
L=P[N <0]=1-<1> _ . (18)
- ~Of+O~-2012
b: Notemployedandlookingfor ajob, orworkingbutwage notobservedforsome·
otherreason: thecontributionis thecomplementto 1ofcontributionIa.,Itshould!







<1 llw <1 llw '
(20) (
[3 - 1 W 01:)
-I-N+I-1:CY,WN)oCWN) "
which should be multiplied by C1 - II) but again this factors out. In(20), we have
made use ofthefact that the distribution of E 1 given w is normalwith mean and
variance given by:
92
2 0 12 2
V(Ell W) = 0 1 - -2 =: 0 11w· (21 )
O2
In this tobit-type model all coefficients are identified. In the empirical imple-
mentation of the model, we will use a version of this model based on grouped
hours. We refrain from a detailed presentation ofthe latter because it would
require introducing a wealth of supplementary notation. Identification in the
groupedversionisachievedassoonasaboundaryseparatingtwogroupsofpositive
hours is set. We now turn to the complete panel specification.
Theonlystochastfecomponentsofthemodelareinthe(log)wage andtasteshifter
equations. Renamingvariables and coefficients in both equations as follows:
yi:) Iii InYhi Yi;) E In W hi
-;;(2)E1X-
-hi hl_ (22)
where h is the household index and tildas denote disregard ofthe constant term
orits coefficient, we can rewrite both equations as:
Y
(I) = e(l) + -;;(I)e(l) + TJ(I) + v(i) + U (i)
hi 0 -hi h I hI i = 1,2 (23)
where the individual effects TJ ~i) are random and the period-specific effects v ~I)
are assumed to be fixed (see Altug and Miller, 1990, for a critique ofthat pro-
cedure). Weshall allow for correlation between the random effects and some of
the regressors. Exclusion restrictions in the specification of different sets of
regressors correlatedwith these random effects may be used on top ofexclusion
restrictionsbetween X and Z.It might beuseful tospecify directly all exclusion
restrictionsandtodistinguishbetweentimevarying andtimeinvariantregressors.
FollowingChall!berlain (1984) thecorrelationbetween individualeffects and the
relevant regressors is expressed, in the case ofa balanced panel, as:
T K
TJ
(I) = \ \ a(i)-;;(i) + t:(I)
h L L ks - khs .,h •
s-I k-I
Equation (23) can thenbe rewritten as
Y
(I) = e(l) + -;;(1)0(1) + E(i)
hI 01 -h I hI •
10
(24)
i = 1,2 (25)where
e
(i) (i) (i) (i) SCi) (i) (i»),




whereby the conformation of the coefficient vector e ~i) has not been exactly
respected. We assume that ( ~ ~i) • U ~~) , i = 1,2) and (~~i).i= 1,2) are inde-
pendent. which ensures independence between ( E ~~) • i = 1,2) and
(~~i) • i = 1.2).Furthermorewe assumethat ( E ~i,>•i = 1.2)forgiven t arejointly
normalwithzeromeanandcovariancematrix L I • andcovariancebetweenperiods
will remain unspecified. In thefirst stagewe will estimate equations (33) oneach
wave separatelyalong thelinesdescribed above, andinthesecondstagecombine
the estimates optimally in order to enforce the restrictions embodied in (25-27).
Our treatment ofunbalanced panels is described in Appendix C.
4 Results
Weshall discuss onlysecond-stage resultsfor the modelwhere hours information
is grouped according to the cut-points 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, 37.5 hours per.week.The.
choice of these cut-points is guided by three considerations. Firstly, we wish to
use as much information as we validly can. Secondly, the minimum length of an
interval should be five hours, as Figure 1 suggests.4 Thirdly, thegroups below20
and above 40 hours are too sparse to be subdivided. The sample used in the
estimation is restricted to womenwho would notbe entitled to the means:-tested
benefits giving rise to a marginal tax rate of 100% at zero hours. Given that this
selection r_ule depends only on the "unearned income" and on the demographics
ofthe household, it is exogenous in the framework ofour assumptions.
We present two sets of estimates, according to whether we allow for correlated
random effects or not. We experimented with the choice ofthe weighting matrix
tobeusedinthesecondstageandfound thediagonalmatrixbasedonthediagonal
ofthe asymptoticallyoptimalweighting matrix togive an acceptable compromise
between the two extreme cases ofthe identity matrix and the optimal weighting
matrix. The latter yields counterintuitive results when compared with th~. first-
stage results, suggesting that the imprecise estimation of the joint covariance
matrix ofthe first-stage coefficients leads to a substantial small-sample bias. On
theotherhand,usingtheidentitymatrixlosesinformation.ontherelativeprecision
4 A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that most answers are based on desired daily hours multiplied by
a number ofworkdays per week equal to 5, but this is only a speculation.
11of the first-stage estimates. Other obvious alternatives would be the use of
within-period blocks ofthe optimal weighting matrix, or ofblocks corresponding
to different equations ofthe model.
A first feature of the results is that estimates obtained with the correlated and
uncorrelated random effects models are almost identical. The wage elasticity of
leisure reported at the top ofTable 1 is only exact for people who locally have a
constant marginal tax rate. Its value of about -0.7 is in line, given i~s moderate
precision, with the results of Hujer and Schnabel (1992) for Germany and of
Heckman and MaCurdy (1982) for the USA.
The results for the wage equation are fairly standard: the (log-) wage profile is
bell-shaped in terms of potential experience, with a maximum at 28.5 years.
Disabilityand urbanisationare notsignificant, exceptthatwages are lowerinrural
areas. The schooling variables have been split according to whether the degree
hasbeenobtainedbefore orafter 1974: the patternsofschooling have undergone
deep changes over the seventies, giving different meanings to the possession ofa
given degree before and after these changes. The cut-point 1974 is somewhat
arbitrary. The reference category is "Hauptschule after 1974". Having had that
type ofeducationearlieryields slightly lowerwages, whereas the reverse happens
for the higher levels ofeducation.
In interpreting the coefficients appearing in the taste shifter it must be remem-
bered that an increase in the latter means an increase ofthe weight ofleisure in
the utility function. None of the coefficients in the age polynomial is really
significant and this is also the case in specifications where age does not appear
simultaneouslyas adeterminantoftotaltime availablefor theallocationbetween
market and home time I. The implied maxima for labour supply correspond to
12.5 and 2.8 years for the two models, so that the profile is declining over the
relevant ages.
We accounted for the influence of children in the taste shifter in two different
ways. Firstly, we used a set ofdummy variables indicating the age group of the
youngest child: andsecondly, we used the number ofchildren in eachspecific age
group. Here appears the main difference between uncorrelated and correlated
random effects. The list ofvariables included in the latter is given in Table 2 and
explainsthedrop in magnitude and significance ofthe correspondingcoefficients
in the taste shifter.. It must be borne in mind that arbitrary exclusion restrictions
concerning the time invariant regressors are necessary in order to identify the
model.
Living in oneofthe two southernfederal states appears tosignificantly lower the
taste shifter, although the magnitude of the differential appears quite small in
comparison with the intercept. The reason for this differential may become
apparent when we obtain more detailed information concerning regional vari-
ables. By contrast, education appears to have no impact on preferences between
consumption and leisure: the coefficients are bothvery small and insignificant.
12z
A standar~ practice -in labour supply models where the total number of hours
available L appears in the specification is to set this at some arbitraryvalue, like
for instance some approximation of the total number of hours in a year, 8760
(Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980) or 8736 (Hujer and Schnabel, 1992). In prelimi-
nary estimations we had started with a value based on a minimum of6 hours of
sleep each day, namely 6502 hours available for the allocation between market
andleisure orhomeworktime peryear. With thatchoicewe hadgreatdifficulties
inobtainingconvergencefor modelswith morethanonecut-pointorrelaxingthe
a priorirestriction ofa unitvariance in the taste shifter. By contrast, convergence
was easilyobtainedwhen I wasestimatedalongwiththeothermodelparameters.
!heresults obtained did not differ much from !!lose reported in Table 1, where
L is allowed tovary with age. Moreover, letting L vary overtime may makesense
ifsomeevents happentogathereverybodyfor oneexceptionalactivity. Examples
are nation-wide strikes or important political events like presidential elections,
religiousevents, cataclysmicweather, oreven irregular andwidelywatchedsports
events.However,Table3showsthatabsenceofvariationovertimecanberejected
for none of the variables tested. We come up with a very low minimum of I of
about2250 hours at age 25 and a still low maximum of2500 at age 57, amounting
to something between 40 and 50 hours per week. The standard deviations are
large,yetnotenoughtoencouragetheusualpractice.Ofcoursetheinterpretations
giveninthis paragraphareconditionalonsome moreorless arbitrarychoiceslike
functional form and exclusion restrictions, which invites to some caution, to say
the least.
Table 4 shows quantiles of the distribution of the intertemporaLlabour supply:'
elasticitieswith respect to thegross wage, taking account ofthe tax function. This
explains why some negative figures are reported, whereas for a linear budget
constraint theory would predict only positive numbers. Otherwise, for given
characteristics and wage rate, the labour supply elasticity is roughly inversely
proportional to the level of hours supplied. The results are notably robust with
respect to the treatment ofthe random effects. The distribution is well-behaved
andTable5 shows that, as expected, higher elasticities correspond to lowerlevels
ofhours and are thus no special cause for worry about using the modelfor policy
simulations. A comparison between this table and Table A8 shows that the two
extreme quartiles of the distribution ofelasticities are otherwise rather similar,
except as regards age: the higher quartile is older than the av~rage, the lower
younger, butboth have less small children than the average, and higher observed
marginal tax rates.
13Table 1: Estimation results ofsecond stage for unbalanced panel - hours grouped at 22.5,
27.5,32.5, and 37.5, diagonal ofoptimal weighting matrix in second step ~
(results for the covariance structure are on the next page).
Group ofvariables Variable Uncorrelated Correlated
random effects random effects
coef. t-value coef. t-value
wage elasticity ofleisure -.691 -3.3 ~.506 -3.1
Wage equation constant 1985 2.35 16 2.36 16
constant 1986 2.48 11 2.49 11
constant 1987 2.18 11 2.16 11
constant 1988 2.09 8.4 2.06 8.3
constant 1989 1.84 7.5 1.87 7.7
potential experience /10 .364 3.6 .368 3.6
pot. experience squared /1000 -.639 -3.6 -.648 -3.6
disability .174 2.3 .171 2.2
Urbanisation areas 100' - 500' inhabitants -.031 -1.1 -.031 -1.1
20' -100' .005 .1 .049 .1
less than 20' -.081 -2.8 -.082 -2.8
schooling: highest degree Hauptschule - 1974 or earlier -.115 -2.7 -.115 2.7
Realschule - 1974 or earlier .201 3.2 .204 4.5
Realschule - after 1974 .140 4.5 .140 3.2
Fachober., Abitur - <= 1974 .586 8.0 .584 8.0
Fachober., Abitur - > 1974 .465 9.3 .467 9.4
Taste shifter constant 1985 11.0 2.4 10.3 2.3
constant 1986 11.3 2.6 10.8 2.5
constant 1987 12.0 1.9 9.6 1.8
constant 1988 12.0 2.3 11.3 2.3
constant 1989 14.3 1.9 15.3 1.8
age /10 -.361 -.7 -.063 -.1
age squared /1000 1.44 2.0 1.12 1.6
children youngest child 0-2 years 1.01 2.7 .683 1.9
• 3-5 • .508 1.7 371 1.2
• 6-11 • .624 2.7 .607 2.6
number ofchildren 0-5 1.24 3.7 .798 2.6
6-11 .628 3.6 .333 13
12-15 .570 3.9 .316 1.8
16-25 .241 3.1 .103 1.0
regionalvariables northern states -.172 -1.4 -.169 -1.4
Bayern and Baden-Wiirttemberg -.368 -3.0 -374 -3.1
schooling: highest degree Realschule .111 1.1 .117 1.1
Fachoberschule, Abitur .145 .8 .123 .7
variables appearing in I(1) constant 1985 2318 (334) 2306 (332)
constant 1986 2259 (345) 2279 (347)
constant 1987 1857 (192) 1836 (187)
constant 1988 2093 (248) 2075 (243)
constant 1989 2092 (179) 2089 (180)
.age /10 89.9 2.4 93.6 2.5
variables in random effect (means)
children: youngest child Q..2 years .818 1.7
number ofchildren 0-5 .228 .7 . 6-11 328 13
12-15 326 1.6
16-25 .144 1.1
N.B. (1): bracketednumbers denote standarderrors.
14Table 2: Results for covariance structure· hours grouped at22.5,27.5,32.5, and 37.5,
diagonal ofoptimal weighting matrix insecond step.
Uncorrelated Correlated
randomeffects random effects
coef. std.err coef. std.err
°1 1985 1.422 .36 1.429 .37"
°1 1986 1.548 .40 1.547 .40
°1 1987 2.491 .96 2.390 .90
°1 1988 1.552 .48 1.499 .45
°1 1989 2.112 .91 2.179 .99
p 1985 .185 .08 .173 .08
p 1986 .229 .08 .230 .08
p 1987 .170 .08 .174 .08
p 1988 .207 .09 .215 .09
p 1989 .121 .08 .114 .09
02 1985 .324 .01 .324 .01
02 1986 .368 .02 .368 .02
02 1987 .350 .02 .350 .02
02 1988 .367 .02 .367 .02
02 1989 .345 .02 .345 .02
Table 3: Wald Tests for second stage - hours grouped at 22.5,27.5,32.5, and 37.5,
diagonal ofoptimal weighting matrix in second step; rejectionprobabilities in %.
Test uncorrelated correlated
HO: constant intercepts inwage equation 26.4 28.1
HO: constant intercepts in taste shifter 99.7 98.1
HO: constant intercepts in I: 66.7 60.2
HO: constant a I : 79.7 79.2
'.
HO: constant .P : 84.9 81.5
HO: constant a2 : 19.4 19.4Table 4: Labour supply elasticities with respect to the gross wage:
descriptive statistics (participants only).
mean median min 1% 10% 90% 99% max
Uncorrelated random effects
1985 0.78 0.60 -0.89 0.06 0.12 1.28 7.05 7.52
1986 0.60 0.52 -0.90 -0.04 0.11 0.85 6.76 7.55
1987 0.41 0.32 -0.90 -0.87 0.03 0.77 2.56 4.27
1988 0.60 0.54 -0.78 -0.01 0.10 1.12 2.55 6.75
1989 0.56 0.46 -0.72 0.02 0.10 1.00 4.38 6.12
Correlated random effects
1985 0.78 0.60 -0.89 0.06 0.12 1.28 7.06 7.55
1986 0.61 0.53 -0.90 -0.03 0.11 0.87 6.85 7.64
1987 0.40 0.32 -0.90 -0.87 0.03 0.76 2.55 4.26
1988 0.60 0.54 -0.78 -0.01 0.10 1.12 2.55 6.75
1989 0.56 0.47 -0.72 0.02 0.10 1.00 4.40 6.15
Table 5: Laboursupply elasticities with respect to the gross wage (participants
only): mean ofselected variables for the extreme quartiles in 1985.
"
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ofWest Germany (SOEP) from 1985 to 1989. A general description ofthat data
sourcecanbefoundinKruppandHanefeld(1987, 1988) andRendtelandWagner
(1991). Sampleswhich arevery similar.to the one used in this study are described
in detail in Bertschek et al (1991).
Ourselectionstartsfromasampleofwomenwho hadatleastoneregularinterview
between 1985 and 1989 (for the respective numbers see table AI). Non-germans
have been deleted from the sample for two reasons. Firstly, we do not have the
same information for them as for Germans, especially concerning human capital
type variables. Secondly, guest-workers are oversampled in the SOEP, with
endogenous selection for labour supply studies. Whether this argument is valid
for thewives in this group remains open to question.
Inordertoavoidconflictsbetweenparticipation,education,and(early)retirement
decisions, we restricted the sample to women who were notyounger than25 and
not older than 57.
Thewomenofthesample have tobecontinuously marriedwith thesamepartner
inthelast18months.Thishasbeenenforcedsincewewanttorestrictourattention
to women which have already "adjusted" to marriage. Due to the construction of
the data at the household level we need unambiguous familiar relationships
between the head ofthe household and the rest. This results in rejecting women
who are neither head ofthe household or the wife ofthe head ofthe household,
andhouseholdswithotheradults(notchildoradoptivechildofheadofhousehold)
living in that household.
Thefinal crucialdecisionwas tobasethesampleonthenon-self-employed.When
we include the self-employed we have several problems which we have notbeen
able to overcome with SOEP-data: the tax system for the self-employed is com-
plicated and involves important deductions connected with economic activities.
The data does not contain the information needed for the computation ofthese
deductions. Furthermore~ the labour supply ofthe self-employed (if that phrase
makes sense at all: is the time they devote to their business labour?) cannot be
modelled in the same way as the behaviour ofwage earners. For instance, ifone
were to computegross hourlywage rates for them, onewould find that theywork
very long hours for ridiculously low wages. For microeconometric studies ~f the
behaviour qf the self-employed, see Pohlmeier and Pfeiffer (1991) and the ref-
erences therein.
Those individuals whose answers concerning variables used in the estimation
(except wages and hours, where our procedures can deal with incomplete infor-
mation)were incompletewere deleted.A balancedpanelwould leave uswith 822
different individuals whereas there are over 1900 such individuals in the
unbalanced panelwe use.
17In order to avoid the non-convexity of the budget set caused by means-tested
benefits, we finally restricted the sample used in the estimation to females who
would not be entitled to the means-tested benefits giving rise to a marginal tax
rate of 100% at zero hours. This selection rule depends only on the "unearned
income" and on the demographics of the household, and is exogenous in the
framework ofour assumptions.
Table AI: Selection ofsample.
bal'd. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
all females with valid interview 4015 5631 5378 5308 5068 4930
german nationality' 3073 4287 4090 4010 3774 3586
age 25 - 57 1660 2434 2328 2262 2129 2038
married and living together with partner 1240 1903 1781 1736 1633 1555
no ~artnerchange, marriage, divorce, 1199 1846 1726 1669 1582 1510
etc. 1196 1842 1717 1656 1575 1499
head orwife ofhead ofhousehold 1195 1842 1717 1656 1574 1499
no other adults in household 1048 1734 1621 1548 1477 1411
not self-employed 822 1530 1419 1361 1266 1192
after deleting missing values•• 689 1328 1237 1193 1139 1068
no benefits at zero hours
• in last 18 months
** except hours and female income information
A.2 Variables
A.2.1 Variables relevant for the calculation ofincome and taxation
Inorderto obtain a precise idea oftheform ofthe budgetsetofeach household,
we require a large amount of information. Yet in order to avoid the loss ofyet
another wave we invoke various approximations when computing the income
variables and the rent. The latter is relevant for the computation of the means-
tested housing benefit (Wohngeld). When we compute the housel:told's rent, we
make two assumptions:
(i) Owners earn too much money to be eligible to the housing benefit. This
assumption allows us to ignore the 'imputed rent' ofowners in order to compute
the housing benefit.
(ii) Inordertocomputetorelevantrentwe havetoaddoverheadcostsfor heating
andwarm water: This variable is only available from 1986 on. We found that the
ratio (rent+overhead) / rent is moreorless constantacross households andover
time (mean: 1.26-1.30, variance: 0.016-0.022). Sowe used a conservativeestimate
ofthe 'warm' rent as being equal to 1.25 ofthe 'cold' rent.
18Whenconstructing incomevariables we have to choose between two alternatives:
either using earnings reported in the current year (earnings in the last working
month), orconstructing income from all sources out ofthe relevant retrospective
questions concerning the previous year. The latter option has the advantage that
we can reconstruct the yearly income of the household more precisely, because
we have information on the number of months corresponding to total earnings
and further informationonvarious othersources ofincome. However, thiswould
result in the loss of the last wave. In future work, especially when the next wave
ofthe SOEP is available, this should be done more precisely.
Table A2: Empirical quantiles ofyearly earnings from capital per houshold in
current DM (balanced panel).
Quantile 5% 10% 50% 90% 95%
1985 0 0 -217 1078 1700
1986 10 100 218 1089 2500
1987 0 20 224 1071 2000
1988 0 120 223 1070 2000
1989 0 120 220' 1011 3203
Table A3: Empirical quantiles ofyearly earnings from capital per houshold in
> current DM (unbalanced panel).
Quantile 5% 10% 50% 90% 95%
1985 0 0 217 1078 2500
1986 0 100 218 1089 3547
1987 0 0 224 1071 3000
1988 0 100 223 1069 2500
1989 0 100 220 1011 3203
We ignored the taxabilityofcapital income due to thestructure,ofourmodel (see
the reference above to Blomquist, 1985). Tables A2 and A3 provide empirical
evidence in supportofthis strategyfor oursample. Wheninterpretingthefigures,
one should bear in mind that only capital income above 800 DM is taxable.
Moreover, there seems to be a well established habit ofcheating about the rest
(see NohrbaB and Raab, 1989, about the experienceswith the introductionofthe
"Quellensteuer" in 1989).
19Additionalearnings-relatedincome,suchas bonuses,a 13thor14thmonthlywage,
etc., could onlybeobserved theyear after it has beenreceived. Again, taking this
informationintoaccountwould meanthe loss ofthe lastwave. TableA4gives the
yearly income including additional income as a proportion of monthly income.
From this table we see that it may be a reasonable approximation to multiply
monthly earnings with 13 to obtain the yearly earnings.
Table A4: Empirical quantiles ofthe ratio ofyearly earnings + additional
































Gross wages for the participants have been computed as follows: reported gross
monthlyearningsofthelastmontharedividedby reportedaverageworkinghours
(perweek) ofthelast month multiplied by 4.3. Theresulting number is multipled
by 13/12inordertoaccountfor the additionalincome component.Theempirical
distribution ofgross wages thus computed is given in Tables AS and A6. In our
final sample we consider observations in the lower and the upper percentile of
thewage distributionas indicatingunplausiblevaluesfor eithertheworkinghours
orthegross monthlyincome. Furthermorethe combinationofhours information
(on a weekly base) and the income information (on a monthly base) is doubtful
for those working irregularly: we would underestimate the hourly wage rate of
those notemployedfor the whole month. Otherfeatures ofthe datathat require
carefultreatment:severalindividualsclaimthattheyworkfull time (on aseparate
question) whereas they actually work less than 20 hours (minimum 2 hours I);
other individuals claim that they work part time, but report more than 35 hours
a week. Hencewe disc,!rded the information onwages for these groups and treat
them like the job seekers for whom the only information we use is the fact that
their desired hours are positive.
20Table AS: Empirical quantiles ofgross hourly wages offemales in DM (bal-
anced panel)
Quantile 1% 5% 10% 50% 90% 95% 99% Ref.5
1985 3.3 6.3 8.1 14.1 22.0 25.2 69.3 12.54
1986 4.8 7.2 8.8 14.5 22.6 27.4 60.5 13.04
1987 4.4 6.9 8.6 15.1 23.9 26.2 51.7 13.61
1988 3.9 6.7 9.2 15.6 25.4 31.5 66.1 14.21
1989 4.0 7.6 9.2 16.4 26.7 35.7 88.2 14.76
Table A6: Empirical quantiles ofgross hOUrl~ wages offemales in DM (unbal-
anced pan~l
Quantile 1% 5% 10% 50% 90% 95% 99% Ref.
1985 3.7 5.7 7.9 13.9 21.4 25.2 62.0 12.54
1986 3.7 6.0 8.1 14.5 22.8 27.8 84.0 13.04
1987 3.5 6.5 8.3 15.1 24.0 27.6 63.0 13.61
1988 3.8 6.0 8.8 15.5 25.2 31.5 56.7 14.21
1989 4.0 7.5 9.2 16.4 26.1 31.5 71.5 14.76
Inthecomputationofgrosswage aproblemarises with thetreatmentofovertime
work. Since the relevance ofthatproblem for ourstudy basically depends on the
type of compensation for overtime work, Table A7 indicates the relative
importance ofthe various types ofcompensation represented in oursample, for
1986.Unfortunately, noinformationwhatsoeverconcerningovertimeis available
for1987, sin~e thosequestionshavebeenomittedfromthesurveyinthatparticular
year. Incasea premium hasbeenpaidontopofthehourlywage (38 observations)
it has a mean of 26% and a standard deviation of 9%. We cannot exclude the
possiblity that we measured the wage rate of those who were compensated in
terms of leisure with error, if overtime work and its compens,ation do not take
place in the same month. Since obviously the bias can go in eitherdirection, we
decided to ignore the problem.
5 As a loose reference, we report the average hourly gross wage (in currentDM) ofwomen in the industrial sector
in the FRG. Source: Statistical Yearbooks 1988-1990, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. This is given only as a
rough indication for the quality of the wage information obtained from our sample: given the differences m th.e
populations considered, no exact correspondence should be expected. .
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A.2.2 Variables used in estimation
1. Wages: real gross wage = gross wage) price index; gross wage discussed in
A.2.1; price index: 1985 1.000, 1986 0.998, 1987 0.999, 1988 1.010, 1989 1.039.
Source: cost ofliving index from Statistical Yearbook, Statistisches Bundesamt.
2. Hours: desired, for participants: normal weekly hours over the year; observed,
includingovertime,for computationofgrosswage (see A.2.1.).Theseare average
weekly hours over the year. Figure 1 shows histograms ofdesired and observed
hours and the difference between the two for 1987.
3. Non-participants: womenwho reportbeingregistered as unemployed, orbeing
out of the labour force and, in case they answered yes to the question "future
participation(yes, perhaps,no)"declaredthattheydonotlookfor ajobthatwould
begin immediately.6
4. Seekers: women who report being registered as unemployed, or being out of
thelabourforce and,incasetheyansweredyes tothequestion"futureparticipation
(yes, perhaps, no)" declared that they do look for a job that would begin
immediately.
5. Participants: ~omen who report working full- oder part-time, or being in
vocational training, or working irregularly, orwho report positive desired hours
or positive observed ~ours.
6. Participants with missing- wage information: participants with missing infor-
mation on earnings or on observed hours or on desired hours,? or working
irregularly, or reporting to work full time but with average weekly hours below
20, orreportingtowork parttimebutwith averageweekly hours above 35, orwith
6Another question asked whether a suitable job offer would be accepted immediately or not and yielded in some
cases conflictin~ answers with the former one. We decided against using it on the basis of evidence produced by
Rettore and Tnvellato (1991).
7The latter were not numerous enough tojustifythe creation ofa special category, and oureconometric treatment
permits lumping them with this category.
22computed gross nominal wage in the upper or lower 5% ofthe distribution (the
brackets are, in curent DM per hour: 1985 [3.3,. 69.3]1986 [4.8,. 60.5]1987 [4.4
,. 51.7]1988 [3.9,. 66.1]1989 [4.0,. 88.2]).
We thus have four categories ofobservations: non-participants, seekers, partici-
pants with missing information, and participants with complete information.
7. Age: woman's age in years (year of wave - year of birth), divided by 10. The
square ofthe same variable is used also.
8. Disability: self-reported measure of the "official" extent of disability, on the
interval [0,1], with 0 meaning no disability and 1 meaning 100% disability.8
9. Schooling: threedummiesfor highestgradeingeneraleducation,corresponding
to (years of schooling in brackets): "Hauptschule" (9), "Mittlere Reife" (10),
"Abitur oderZulassung zur Fachhochschule" (13 and 12, respectively).
10. Potential experience: (Age - Years ofschooling - 6) / 10. The square is also
used.
11. Children: (i) Numbers of children: up to 5 years of age; between 6 and 11;
between 12 and 15; older than 15 and still in education. (ii) Dummies youngest
child: up to 2 years ofage; between 3 and 5; between 6 and 11; between 12 and
15; older than 15 and still in education.
12. Regional variables: (i) Dummies for regions: North (Schleswig-Holstein,
Hamburg and Lower Saxony); North Rhine - Westfalia; Centre (Hesse, Rhine-
land-Palatinate, Saarland); South (Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria); Berlin.
13. Urbanization grade (Boustedt): large city and surroundings (more than 500'
inhabitants); medium-sized city and suroundings (between 100' and 500'); small
city and surroundings (between 20' and 100'); town, village, rural (below 20'
inhabitants).
8 The question is whether one is officially ackowledged as disabled, and ifyes which percentage of disability has
been acknowledged, but there is no check ofthe correctness ofthe answer.
23Variable
Table AS: Descriptive statistics.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989































































































































































































































































tax rate at zero hours
tax rate at desired hours
benefits at zero hours
0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.07
0.29 0.19 0.29 0.18 0.30 0.18 0.29 0.17 0.30 0.17
0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10
• participants with "accepted" wage rates only.
24Appendix B: The German Tax System 1985 to 1989
B.l Description ofthe tax model
The tax model accounts for income taxes, social security contributions, child
benefits, social assistance and housing benefits.
(a) Income taxes and social security contributions are modelled in great detail
following Wagenhals (1990) and updatinglegal r,!lIes andfigures presentedthere.
Additionallywe accountfor child benefits, social assistance and housingbenefits.
(b) Child benefits consist in a universal child benefit for all families and an
additional child benefit for certain low income families. They are not taxed. Per
month, they amount to DM 50 for the first child, DM 130 for the second child,
DM 220 for the third child and DM 240 for all subsequent children. (All figures
refer to July 1990.) The benefits for the first child are not means-tested. Child
benefits for subsequent children depend on the annual net income of the pen-
ultimate year (see §11 Bundeskindergeldgesetz). The upper income limit for
married couples equals DM 45,800 peryear plus DM 9,200 for each child that is
entitled,toa childbenefit.Iftheupperincome limit is reached, totalchildbenefits
are reduced by DM 20 per month. Ifthe limit is exceeded, benefits are reduced
stepwise by DM 20 for each DM 480. Benefits may not be reduced below a
minimumofDM 70for thesecondandofDM 140for thethird andallsubsequent
children.
Parents with children who are entitled to the universal child benefit and whose
income is so low that the tax allowance for each child has an incomplete effect or
noeffect may since 1986 claim an additionalchild benefit ('Kindergeldzuschlag'),
according to §11a Bundeskindergeldgesetz. This additional child benefit consists
in a cash benefitwhich sums up to 19 percentofthe 'unused child allowance' per
year (22 percentuntil 1989). Unusedchild allowance is defined as the difference
(ifpositive) betweenthebasicincometax allowance (DM5,616 accordingto §32a
Einkommensteuergesetz in 1990) and the taxable income. The additional child
benefit must not exceed the total amount ofchild allowances towhich a taxpayer
in the lowest income tax-bracket is entitled.
(c) Social assistance ('Sozialhilfe') may be claimed by anyone who is in need, i.e.
whose income from other sources is below a set minimum, if no other means of
support are available. There are two types ofsocial assistance: (1) help for living
('HilfezumLebensunterhalt')forpersonswhocannotearntheirlivingthemselves,
and (2) assistance in special circumstances ('Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen')
for personswho are e.g. ill, invalid orin need ofcareandwhocannotbe expected
to help themselves. (Income limits are given in §79 Bundessozialhilfegesetz.)
The level ofsocial assistance benefits depends on demographic characteristics of
the recipients, on their needs and on local conditions. All available means of
support(e.g. unearnedincome andassets above DM2,000) havetobeexhausted.
Universal and additional child benefits as well as housing allowances count as
unearnedincomeforsocialassistancepurposes.Apartfrom anallowancetocover
25work expenses, all earnings have to bededucted in full from the social assistance
entitlement. Only child-rearing benefits are not accounted for when calculating
social assistance.
Families who are poor enough to qualify for sodal assistance can be entitled to
(i) a basic scale rate ('Sozialhilferegelsatz'), which depends on the age of the
household members, (ii) help to meet the costs of accomodation (including
heating), and (iii) an extra need allowance of 20 per cent of the scale rate
('Mehrbedarfszuschlag') under special conditions, e.g. to meet exceptional
burdens.
(d) Housing benefits: low income families may be entitled to payments from a
housing allowance scheme ('Wohngeld'). Whether a housing benefit is paid
depends on family size, the level ofrent (or housing costs for owner-occupiers)
and the level offamily income. Family income is derived from the total earnings
ofthe househould members using a complex system ofdeductions depending on
the amount and type ofsocial security contributions-paid by thefamily members.
Housing benefit,S consist in a subsidy for rent or housing costs that depends on
housing conditions, age of the housing unit, living space and the local level of
rents.
B.2 Some tax cUlVes for oursample
Figure B1 compares profiles ofwomen's marginal taxes including social security
contributions and means-tested benefits, and of our approximate marginal tax
rates excluding means-tested benefits, as functions of weekly working hours,
evaluatedatdifferentvalues ofthe husbands' andotherfamily members'incomes
and at different values of the woman's gross nominal wage, for the case of one
child younger than 5, and another child between 6 and 11 years ofage.
The plots are drawn for the median, the highest and the lowest percentile ofthe
wagedistributIonfor theparticipants. Since theoverallshapeofthecUlVes remain
fairly stableover time we presentplots for 1987 only. The "true" marginal tax rate
shows a discontinuity ata low number ofhours (between5 and 10 hours typically)
and two more for a large number (typically more than 40 hours).9 The first dis-
continuity is due to the existence of a threshold ofsome 5000 DM (430 DM per
month in 1987) under which no social contributions have to be paid. The second
andthirddiscontinuities comefrom ceilingsontheincomebaseofunemployment
and health insurance contributions and ofpublic pension scheme contributions.
We conclude from the graphs that a profile ofthe marginal tax rate consisting of
a plateau at low hours, followed by a discontinuous increase and then a linear
increase provides a reasonable approximation for a wide range of our sample.
The resulting budgetsetwill then be convex. Since the discontinuity is difficult to
9Thegraphs arebasedon increments ofone hour. This explains that the discontinuities have the misleading aspect
ofsteep continuous segments. On Figure B1a in the top graph, the line for 0.1 wage quantile is stuck at the ceiling
(marginal tax rate of100% throughout).
26handle in a maximum likelihood framework, we replace it by a cubic spline over
a conveniently small interval (see MaCurdy et aI., 1990, for a similar use of
approximated and convexified budget restrictions). Admittedly, the convexifica-
tion could be performed in a more precise way than we propose here, butTables
B1 andB2 suggestthatourapproximation may besufficiently preciseforpractical
purposes. The two problems that are apparent in these tables concern the tax
allowances (at low earnings, the marginal tax rate is zero for those who do not
receive means-tested benefits) and the high marginal tax rates facing those
receiving means-tested benefits. The first of these two problems is not serious
since we are concernedwith desired weekly hours over thewholeyear: as soon as
a woman works in this continuous way, her earnings will excede the allowances.
The other problem is more serious and we cannot deal with it properly within a
framework that necessitates convexity ofthe budgetset. Ourstrategy herewill be
to restrict the sample used in estimation to women who are not eligible at zero
hours for the means-tested benefits which are responsible for the observed
marginal tax rates of100%. Since this eligibility rests entirely onvariables which
our analysis considers as exogenous, no endogenous selection will result.
Table B1: Distribution ofdifferences between marginal tax rates (mtr) obtained
from exact and approximate budget constraints. Benefits included in the
former, excluded in the latter (balanced panel).
year obs. min. 10% 50% 90% max. mean
(a) participants, mtr < 0.9
-0.005 1985 358 -0.196 -0.056 -0.001 0.028 0.139
1986 364 -0.185 -0.048 -0.002 0.020 0.119 -0.006
1987 356 -0.286 -0.041 0.002 0.026 0.128 -0.002
1988 358 -0.304 -0.031 0.003 0.026 0.157 -0.001
1989 353 -0.302 -0.032 0.002 0.021 0.135 -0.002
(b) non participants, mtr < 0.9
1985 395 -0.339 -0.250 -0.148 -0.128 0.000 -0.167
1986 402 -0.359 -0.254 -0.151 -0.141 0.000 -0.175
1987 400 -0.371 -0.266 -0.158 -0.145 0.000 -0.181
1988 396 -0.375 -0.244 -0.162 -0.147 0.000 -0.176
1989 396 -0.375 -0.249 -0.166 -0.147 0.000 -0.180
(c) non participants, mtr > 0.9
1.000 1985 34 0.860 0.884 1.000 1.000 0.970
1986 34 0.857 0.890 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.984
1987 34 0.843 0.888 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.984
1988 35 0.863 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992
1989 38 0.838 0.851 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.976
27Table B2: Distribution ofdifferences between marginal tax rates (mtr) obtained
from exact and approximate budget constraints. Benefits included in the
former, excluded in the latter (unbalanced panel).
1985
(a) participants, mtr < 0.9
650 -0.233 -0.058 -0.003 0.083 0.149 -0.006
1986 600 -0.185 -0.050 -0.000 0.025 0.147 -0.004
1987 585 -0.286 -0.048 0.001 0.028 0.145 -0.004
1988 560 -0.304 -0.033 -0.005 0.033 0.157 -0.001
1989 534 -0.302 -0.034 0.000 0.024 0.142 -0.002
(b) non participants, mtr < 0.9
1985 688 -0.355 -0.256 -0.148 -0.140 0.093 -0.168
1986 660 -0.359 -0.254 -0.151 -0.141 0.000 -0.173
1987 615 -0.371 -0.264 -0.154 -0.145 0.000 -0.178
1988 572 -0.375 -0.242 -0.159 -0.147 0.000 -0.175
1989 541 -0.375 -0.246 -0.162 -0.147 0.000 -0.177
(c) non participants, mtr > 0.9
1985 109 0.860 0.893 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.982
1986 99 0.857 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.989
1987 87 0.843 0.999 1.000 LOOO 1.000 0.988
1988 70 0.852 0.999 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 0.992
1989 57 0.838 0.852 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972
28Figure Bla
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30Appendix C: Unbalanced Panels
We first concentrate on the case ofuncorrelated random effects. Let D tt denote
the indicatorvariable ofthe event "individual i is present in wave ttl. We assume
that the variables Dit are independent over individuals. The pseudo-likelihood
.function we maximize in.the first stage is:
N T
InL(y,d;x,n)= L Lditln{.f(Yit Ixit,nl,dit)P[dit Ixit,nl]}·(Cl)
i= I Ie I
Ifwe assume that the process governing presence or absence from the panel is
independent of (Y,x) and does not depend on the parameter vector n, the
first-stage M-estimator it will maximize
N T





and will converge towards
n° = arg max E E 'V(Y I X, D,n)
n x, d 0
T
= arg max E E E I Dtln.f(Yt IXt'nt)·
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Consistent estimators for these are given by the sample analogues:
_ 1 '\' '\' 01n .fit° 1n .fis 1 - 0
1=- L L d . d.----=:-1
NilS tt ts on on' N'
- 1 LL 02ln .fit 1 - 0 J = -- d =:-J ,
Nil tt 0non I N
so thatwe can estimate the variance of if used in the minimum distance stage by
- - 1 --I - --I -0-1 -0 -0-(
V(n)=-J IJ =J 1 J N .
31Inthecase ofcorrelated random effects, the problemwith a direct application of
Chamberlain's approach is that a model explaining the individual effect as a
function of leads and lags of the regressors would imply conditioning on unob-
served regressors. Thus we revert to an approach which is more in line with
Mundlak (1978): for the random effect we postulate the following model:
1\ -
C i = - L X isa + Vi =: X I a + Vi'
T t seS,
(C4)
where S i denotes the set ofwaves in which individual i participates, T I = lSiI'
and v i denotesanerrortermwhichis independentofallregressors, homoscedastic
and normally distributed, but with unrestricted autocorrelation pattern over dif-
ferent waves. These assumptions are not much more restrictive or arbitrary than
thosemadein Chamberlain'sapproach, where only observed regressors aretaken
into account anyway, andthey allow straightforward application ofthe procedure
outlined above. Evenobservations which appear in a single wave canbeused: the
presence ofobservations ofother types identifies the parameter vector a.
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